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The Polish Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, in his capacity as Prosecutor
General, wants to apply to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to have the EU
regulation connecting the rule of law with the suspension of EU funds declared
inconsistent with the Polish constitution. Why is the member of a government that
has recently consented to adopting the regulation, now going to fight it? And are
there any grounds for doing so?
The motion refers to the EU regulation on the possibility to suspend funding for a
member state that fails to comply with the rule of law (Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020
on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget). This
regulation was finally (yet with some difficulty) adopted in December 2020 and is
accompanied by extensive guidelines on how and when the regulation may be
applied.
The EU law perspective
From the point of view of EU law the situation is unambiguous. The regulation
on conditionality, after its entry into force, will apply to all Member States in full,
starting from 1 January 2021. It may cease to be effective by way of either repealing
legislation or annulment by the Court of Justice (CJEU). In this respect, the
government agencies may use the possibility to bring an action for annulment of the
EU legislative act (Article 263 TFEU). From the perspective of a Member State’s
government this is the only possible way of challenging the validity and effectiveness
of the Conditionality Regulation in the territory of Poland.
In particular, it is not possible to challenge the validity or effectiveness of such
a legislative act before a Member State’s constitutional tribunal. Already since
the judgment Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (11/70), the Court of Justice
has been of the opinion that EU legislative act’s “validity (…) or its effect within
a member state cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either
fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles
of its constitutional structure“. Any reservations as to the consistence of an EU
regulation with fundamental rights, including those provided for in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, or with the Treaty based on which it has been issued, may
be considered exclusively by the CJEU. In such a case, a national court, including
the Constitutional Tribunal, would have to refer a question for preliminary ruling to
the CJEU with regard to the regulation’s validity in light of the guarantees set out in
EU law (and analogous to those set out in the national constitution). However, this
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way of challenging the validity of a regulation is not available to the Member State’s
bodies that could have brought an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
The national law perspective
On the national side, the Prosecutor General may file with the Constitutional
Tribunal an application for examining the constitutionality of an act of Parliament
or an international agreement (Article 191(1) in conjunction with Article 188(1) of
the Constitution). An EU regulation is a law that is established by an international
organization and, in the light of the Constitution, is neither an act of Parliament nor
an international agreement.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has already examined an EU regulation (case
file no. SK 45/09). However, this has been done under the constitutional complaint
procedure which gives the possibility to examine not only acts of Parliament but also
other “normative acts” (Article 79 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Tribunal
has considered the EU regulation to be such a normative act. The examination
of a regulation under the complaint procedure is, however, subject to numerous
restrictions that emphasize the extraordinary nature of such examination.
It should be emphasized that such examination is, in principle, still contrary to EU
law since national courts’ judgments may not restrict the effective application of
regulations that are valid and binding in the Union regulation system.
The consequences of such a ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal would also be
questionable. A consequence of a ruling on a legislative act’s inconsistency with the
Constitution should be the loss of the act’s binding force. The CT has no powers to
derogate or annul EU regulations, either under the Constitution or the EU law. In
the case no. SK 45/09 the CT pointed, solely for the purposes of the constitutional
complaint, to the act’s possible lack of effect in the territory of Poland. However,
in the light of EU law, such a ruling would not impact the validity or effectiveness
of the EU regulation, according to the case law of the Court of Justice. National
bodies should therefore continue to apply the regulation. Otherwise, they would
expose Poland to the risk of a complaint brought by the Commission under Article
258 TFEU.
The conclusion is clear: as long as the EU regulation remains valid and effective
at the EU level, EU institutions (the Commission and the EU Council) may apply it
with regard to Poland. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that in the future we shall
face a surprising judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal finding, as a result of the
Prosecutor General’s application, that the EU regulation’s compliance with the
Constitution may be subject to review contrary to its literal wording. However, this
will not protect Poland or its citizens against the consequences of violating the rule of
law, as provided for in the regulation, i.e. the suspension of EU funding for projects
implemented in Poland.
In this respect, the regulation’s applicability is in no way dependent on actions of
national government bodies or on judgments of domestic courts. Moreover, in the
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event of a suspension of EU funding, the member state concerned is required to
make up, by itself and from its own public budget, for the missing EU funds (Article
5(2) of the Regulation) so that the funding beneficiaries do not suffer the effects of
the suspension. Therefore, a possible judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal will not
help the member state in any way if the Commission brings to the CJ a complaint
regarding the evasion of the obligations under EU law.
The political perspective
Therefore, in the absence of any legal sense, the application seems to have a
political motive behind it.
Firstly, this way the Minister of Justice wants to mobilize the ruling coalition, of which
he is a part himself, to oppose the EU actions regarding the rule of law. He has done
this before by opposing Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki quite strongly.
At that time, he suggested that the Prime Minister would be considered “a gutless
wonder” [in Polish “mi#kiszon”] (whatever this was supposed to mean) if he would
not veto the EU budget in connection with the planned adoption of the rule of law
regulation.
Secondly, while it is clear that the Prosecutor General’s actions cannot block
the entry into force of the regulation, or lead to its derogation or limitation of
effectiveness by the national Constitutional Tribunal, not all decisions regarding
the EU budget package and the Recovery Fund have yet been taken. Note should
be taken of the fact that that the Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14
December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union still requires
ratification by all EU Member States. And this is an important element of the so-
called Recovery Fund (Next Generation EU). In this respect, the mobilization of a
part of the ruling coalition, taking place as a result of the Constitutional Tribunal’s
controversial judgment regarding the regulation on the rule of law, could be a
motivation for blocking the ratification process in Poland by the ruling majority, even
at the cost of serious political disturbances at the EU level.
It is therefore self-evident that the Prosecutor General, responsible for developing
and implementing “judicial reforms” in Poland, is afraid that they will be considered
a violation of the rule of law in the light of the new regulation on conditionality. And
here, I am afraid, it is impossible to disagree with the Public Prosecutor General.
This is confirmed, primarily, by the following: the Commission application under
Article 7(1) TEU, pending before the EU Council; the numerous proceedings
conducted by the Commission under Article 258 TFEU with regard to the threats
to the judiciary’s independence in Poland, and the numerous references for a
preliminary ruling from Polish courts, pending before the Court of Justice of the EU
and relating to the issue in question. I believe that these cases, when resolved, will
demonstrate the true “Emperor’s New Clothes” as in the J. C. Andersen’s tale.
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